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Chapter 13
Delinking Benefits from a
Single Employer: Alternative
Multiemployer Models
Teresa Ghilarducci

The United States is unique among developed nations in depending heavily
on the provision of social insurance through the employment relationship.
That is, the employment nexus is the focus of provision in this country for
health and life insurance, disability coverage, retirement beneWts, and
numerous other programs that, in other developed countries, are often provided at the government level. As a consequence of this country’s unique
approach, most analysis of the employee beneWt environment has focused
on how and why a particular employer offers work-based health, pension,
and other programs. To date, however, there have been very few studies on
alternative modes of beneWt provision in the United States, including voluntarily provided employee beneWt plans that span employers.
In this chapter we explore multiemployer pension plans in the United
States, examining what they do and how they function. A Wrst section
assesses the historical development of these plans in the United States,
while a second section traces the scope and special features of these multiemployer plans. We next turn to the developments in the employer-provided
beneWt paradigm. Finally we ask whether a multiemployer format might be
general enough to be able to provide coverage to the substantial fraction of
workers lacking employment-based pension plans in this country at present,
and what role multiemployer plans might play in years to come.

A Brief History of U.S. Multiemployer Pension Plans
Most multiemployer plans in the United States are of the deWned beneWt
(DB) variety. Thus in a typical multiemployer plan, the beneWt formula is
based on service times a percentage of Wnal salary, much like the Wnal paybased single employer deWned beneWt plans. The replacement rate for a
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twenty-Wve-year employee depends very much on the industry that the worker
was in. A short freight driver in the trucking sector could receive $1,700 per
month from his pension, just under his social security beneWt and hence
equal to almost one-half of his retirement income.
What is unique about multiemployer plans is their diversity. They generally cover many occupations in one industry, one craft in many industries,
or many occupations in one industry. Examples of industry-wide, geographically based pension plans in the United States include the United Food and
Commercial Workers fund in Northern California, which negotiates pensions and health insurance across a number of large employers including Safeway and other grocery stores. The International Ladies Garment
Workers Union and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Funds
cover production workers across a range of employers in the needle trades.
Taking a broader perspective, the Sheet Metal Workers, Bricklayers, Carpenters, and other building trades funds cover particular trades operating
across a wide range of diverse industries. The Western Conference of Teamsters pension plan covers many occupations in several industries in the
thirteen western states — grocery delivery drivers, warehouse workers, and
long-haul freight truckers.

Early Developments
During the historical development of union-initiated and jointly agreed
upon multiemployer pension plans in the United States, several issues
became salient. In the 1880s, labor unions began as “mutual aid” societies,
with their major function the collection of funds from members in order
to provide collective goods such as funeral beneWts. The concept of linking contributions directly to payroll was an extension of this concept of
self-help.
The Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and Electrical Contractors (Local
3) of New York was probably the Wrst union to establish a multiemployer
pension plan, in 1929 (EBRI 1997). However, this was not an auspicious
time since many pension plans disappeared during the Depression due to
poor funding records. Other negotiated multiemployer plans were established in the needle trades and in coal mining, and in these industries,
unions alone controlled their administration during this early period.
An important legislative innovation in the multiemployer pension business was put in place in 1947, with the Taft-Hartley amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act (sec. 302c.5.). Under this regulation, employers sponsoring a multiemployer plan were required to have at least the same
number of trustees on the pension boards, as did the union. This bill was
initially opposed by organized labor, and to effect passage, Congress was
forced to override President Truman’s veto.
Many of the regulations passed under the Taft-Hartley amendments were
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intended to limit union control over the pension assets. These included prohibitions restricting employers from paying pension contributions directly
to union leaders, rules holding pension trustees liable for pension decisions,
and requirements that rules be applied equitably regarding both employers
and workers. Though these regulations were often decried by the labor movement, they provided legitimacy and ultimately substantial strength to multiemployer plans.
While the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) was not the Wrst
group to negotiate pensions in the United States, it greatly helped deWne
the role that unions would have in establishing workplace pensions in years
following the Great Depression.1 Declining coal demand and automation of
these dangerous debilitating jobs caused substantial worker displacement
during this time. In 1945, the UMWA demanded a fully employer-paid,
$100 per month, pension for old and retiring miners, characterizing the
demand as “payment for past service.” Instead of arguing that pensions
were a type of deferred wage (payment for services rendered) that had to
be accumulated before paying out a beneWt, the UMWA (and many other
industrial CIO unions afterward) argued that pensions were depreciation
payments owed to labor and were analogous to employers’ accounting for
capital depreciation (Sass 1997). In this light, pensions could be seen as
complements to, rather than substitutes for, higher wages.
The UMWA demanded employer-paid pensions, but plan origins dictated
that the coal miners’ plan be jointly trusteed with the employers of these
constituencies. In the 1940s President Truman delegated his Secretary of
Interior to mediate the negotiations in the key coal industry, and he encouraged the relatively weak employers in this vital industry to settle with the
powerful union.
Joint pension investment administration was initially not a hotly contested issue because the plans were operated on a pay-as-you go basis — that
is, contributions collected were immediately paid out in beneWts rather
than investing the monies in a trust fund. Coal plan liabilities grew quickly
over time as miners lost jobs during the Great Depression. The union negotiated for and won a doubling of the royalties per ton that Wnanced the
pension during the period 1948–52. President John L. Lewis argued that
employers should share the beneWts of automation since workers paid
the costs. In an under-appreciated development, the UMWA pension plan
negotiated a new funding base where contributions were structured as a
function of tonnage mined per hour rather than work hours. This formula
explicitly shared the beneWts of greater productivity with the workers.
The industrial unions in the rubber, steel, and auto industries were also
concerned with bargaining for employer-paid pensions to be paid immediately to current retirees and older workers. As a result, they concentrated on
immediate payouts, rather than on building up a stock of assets in a funded
plan. These unions did not argue for payments based on productivity nor
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did they bargain for control of the pension fund investments; in fact weaker
industrial unions in a sense gave up control of the fund in exchange for
past service credits.
Over this period employers resisted including pensions in collective
agreements, but at the same time, pensions became increasingly important
personnel and tax reduction tools. The tax incentive was expanded during
World War II, with wartime wage/price control policies encouraging companies to boost employee beneWts rather than wages. Many economists
also argue that tax-favored status of pensions is an important incentive for
employers to provide pensions on the margin (Reagan and Turner 2000).
Pensions, heath insurance, vacation, and other so-called “fringe beneWts”
were at that time deemed non-inXationary, and thus they were exempted
from wage controls. Furthermore, proWts spent on beneWts were not subject
to the World War II and Korean excess proWts tax. In the three decades
preceding World War II, the U.S. employer-based beneWt system grew to
cover two-thirds of the working population for health insurance, and onehalf of the working population for pensions. Tax incentives made employer
expenses for qualiWed employee beneWts tax-deductible, and as explained
above, the labor movement promoted the creation of health insurance
and retirement programs at the company and industry level in the 1930s
and 1940s. Nonunion companies frequently matched the beneWt offerings
provided in the union sector in order to remain competitive and thwart
unionization efforts.
During this period, many employers agreed to provide employee beneWts
to attract scarce workers and sometimes to accede to union demands. But
social expectations led to the belief that employer beneWts were needed to
supplement the incipient social security program. Pensions also helped
employers manage skill supply and quality in dynamic industries such as
construction.

More Recent Developments
The growth in beneWt coverage in the United States continued into the late
1970s, but after that something seems to have changed. Pension coverage
rates in particular stagnated, and have remained Wxed at approximately
50 percent of the workforce. It has been argued that the continuing decline
of unions, and the effectiveness of tax incentives available in individualbased group insurance solutions might explain why employee beneWt coverage has stopped growing (Schiller 2000). Today some groups in society
lack pension coverage, and part of the explanation may be barriers to entry
to primary labor markets. About half of male workers today are covered by
pensions but only 44 percent of women, 43 percent of Black workers, and
30 percent of Hispanic workers. In addition, the growth of casual labor
markets in all industries, especially in fast-growing services and retail trade,
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may threaten pension coverage. Part-time and low-wage workers are disproportionately less likely to have private beneWts as are those in small and
medium-size companies. Approximately 90 percent of public sector workers
are covered by pensions today, but coverage rates in the private sector go as
low as 30 percent and 35 percent in personal and business services and are
close to zero in nonunion construction and trade jobs (EBRI 1997).
In our view, coverage gaps in employee beneWts track and in fact accentuate the growing inequality in earnings experienced in the United States
over the last decade. Some have argued that these gaps may be mainly attributable to worker choices (examples of studies that emphasize employee
pension preferences include Goodfellow and Schieber 1993 and Ippolito
1998). Others contend that declining coverage trends reXect employer
decisions not to offer plans in view of the rise of what might be termed the
“individual responsibility” model. However it is at least possible that multiemployer plans might make it easier for employers to offer beneWts that they
could not within the single-employer framework. This is mainly because the
national social security system, which is national, uniform, and mandatory,
cannot be tailored to the needs of particular industries and regions. Singleemployer plans cannot accomplish this either in this era, since long service
with one employer is not technically practical for many Wrms. Moreover,
even where it is technically possible, workers and Wrms appear not to want
to form such traditional long-term commitments to each other (see Riche
this volume; Camden this volume). An alternative model may be better
suited to this new environment.

Other Multiemployer Pension Frameworks
Multiemployer pensions are found in sectors other than the private sector:
in addition, there are also multiemployer systems in the public and not-forproWt arenas including those established for churches, the Red Cross, charities, and, of course, university and college teachers. There are also hundreds
of pension plans covering public sector workers including state, local, school,
police, and WreWghter employees (Mitchell, McCarthy, Wisniewski, and Zorn
2001). These plans cover many hundreds or thousands of small townships,
counties, state agencies, and school districts. In total, there are over 15 million participants in these plans constituting just under 11 percent of all U.S.
employees but more than 20 percent of all DB participants. Legislation
enabling public sector pension provision varies across state and locality, yet
the structure is generally similar. Typically these plans are deWned beneWt
in nature, though all Wfty states also offer some form of deWned contribution plan in addition.
Some of the largest pension plans in the nation are the long-established
church and educational institutions. The Presbyterian pension fund began
to cover church employees in 1717. The Episcopal Church plan originated
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in 1917 with an initial endowment from a wealthy Episcopalian, J. P. Morgan.
This plan now covers over 8,000 active ministers.2 The Episcopal plan is
joined by plans from several other religious denominations including the
Baptists, Presbyterians, and Methodists. The Church BeneWts Association
in the United States has forty-Wve Protestant plans and the Association also
includes Jewish and Roman Catholic plans. (Goldman 1996). The Teachers
Insurance Annuity Association and College Retirement Equities Fund, now
known as TIAA-CREF, had its roots in a system endowed by Andrew
Carnegie in 1918 for universities and college teachers. It is technically an
association of single-employer plans; but it is clearly one that functions as
a multiemployer plan.
When establishing these pension systems, each of the plans had to confront a nettlesome “past service” issue during the plan’s startup phase. This
refers to the political and practical difWculties of requiring young workers
to pay for the pensions of current retirees who never contributed to the plan.
In practice, the problem was solved by eleemosynary action in the teachers
and church plans (the rich donated enough to cover past service liabilities). However, philanthropists were hiring and not retiring blue-collar
workers and their employers. Workers and employers in industries characterized by competition and Xuctuating demand either paid labor on a spot
market or overcame collective action problems by creating funded pension
plans that would deliver meaningful beneWts and would be as trusted as
banks to handle money well.

The Scope and Special Features
of Multiemployer Plans
Our accounting of pension coverage trends over time brings to the fore the
importance of the multiemployer alternative. In the United States, the private voluntary multiemployer pension system is sometimes seen as a model
for ways to provide retirement insurance in casual labor markets. It is
worth noting that the few industries that have continued to boost employee
beneWt spending faster than cash compensation are precisely those that rely
on private multiemployer plans to deliver pensions: construction, wholesale trade, Wnance, and insurance. The one exception, in Wnance and real
estate, has rising employee beneWt shares but does not depend on multiemployer plans to deliver deWned beneWt pensions.
An assessment of the current size of the multiemployer pension system
is facilitated by data presented in Table 1. Information on the nation’s
200 largest pension plans provided by Pension and Investments includes
church plans (data from the U.S. Department of Labor and the Employee
BeneWts Research Institute do not). In this table it is clear that the assets of
large public plans dominate the top 200 list, followed by corporate plans,
union multiemployer plans, and church plans. Over $4 billion in assets is
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Table 1. Assets of Private Sector and Church Multiemployer Plans Among Top
200 Pension Systems
Name of fund (rank by asset size)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Western Conference of Teamsters (47)
Teamsters Central States (54)
United Methodist Church (79)
United Mine Workers of America (121)
Southern Baptist (127)
Operating Engineers CPF (142)
Boilermaker and Blacksmith (148)
Episcopal Church (149)
Presbyterian Church (155)
1199 Health Care Employees (156)
Evangelical Lutheran Church (162)
Int’l. Assoc. Machinists Natl Pension Fund (168)
Bakery and Confectionery Wrkrs. (169)
Sheet Metal Workers (200)

Total assets in top 200 in private or church multiemployer plans
Total assets in top 200 in Church Plans
Total assets in top 200 in union multiemployer plans
Total assets in top 200 in corporate plans
Total assets in top 200 in public employee plans
Total assets in all top 200 pension funds

Assets (billions)
$23.8
21.2
13.3
8.2
7.8
2.5
4.3
6.7
6.5
6.3
6.0
5.8
5.8
4.9
$123.1
40.3
82.8
1,577.7
2,461.9
4,160.7

Source: Pensions and Investments (2001: 1).

controlled by the largest 200 pension funds, and most, $2.4 billion, are held
by public employee plans. A comparatively smaller portion, $ 0.1 billion, is
in private or church multiemployer plans and the rest, approximately $1.6
billion, is in single employer plans. Thus from the perspective of total private pension assets, the bulk is no longer held by single employer plans in
the United States.
From other sources, we Wnd that 20 percent of active DB plan participants in the private sector had a multiemployer plan in 1996 (EBRI 1997).
This represents an impressive growth since 1950, when private multiemployer plans covered only 10 percent of active pension DB participants,
though the trend leveled off since 1960 when 18 percent of the active DB
plan workforce had multiemployer coverage. Another way to assess the
importance of collectively bargained multiemployer plans is to note that 12
percent (11 million out of a total 92 million) plan participants in any
employer-sponsored plan were in multiemployer plans (U.S. Department of
Labor 2000).
Almost all workers in heavy construction, shoe repair stores, liquor stores,
and others depend on multiemployer plans for supplements to Social Security and their individual savings plans. Among heavy construction, 94 percent of industry workers, retirees, and dependents covered by a DB plan
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are in multiemployer plans and 55 percent of those participating in DC
plans have them through a multiemployer plan. The Wgures are 59 percent
of apparel employees, 73 percent of retail food store employees, and 39 percent of furniture industry participants (Table 2). Table 2 also reports wage
rates and shows that earnings in the service and retail area, where multiemployer plans are important delivery systems, are lower than average rate
of $13.24 per hour. However, multiemployer plans also deliver pension beneWts in some highly skilled labor markets as well.
Collectively bargained Taft-Hartley funds sponsored by the same union
in a given craft or industry allow participants to build pension vesting and
beneWt service while holding jobs with different signatory employers who
contribute to the same plan. This is highly effective in facilitating labor supply in decentralized industries with migratory workforces like construction,
trucking, retail food, the garment trades, and some of the service industries. This level of local labor market portability in the Taft-Hartley world
can be extended geographically through formal reciprocity agreements
between different pension plans nationwide in the same industry sponsored
by the same union. Several unions actually administer national reciprocity
agreements between large numbers of local and regional pension plans
with formal dispute resolution procedures.

Scope and Special Features of Multiemployer Plans
Judging from the diversity of plans examined thus far, it might be thought
that the political provenance of the multiemployer structure, deriving as
it does from the early presidents’ coal and steel boards, explains why these
funds are jointly trusteed with equal representation from labor and management. This would be mistaken, however, since the essential feature of
these funds is that they are voluntary and provide funding for a long-term
liability.

Governance and Legal and Fiduciary Standards
Trust law as codiWed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) requires that pension plan trustees act according to the “duty of
loyalty” principle. This means that trustees must act for the sole beneWt of
the plan beneWciaries.
In the case of multiemployer plans, management and labor trustees have
a common purpose in the pension arena, though they may be opponents
on other issues. The plans’ unique joint governance structure leads to many
special outcomes. For instance trustees from both sides of the table report
they have a great deal of inXuence over the administration of the fund,
which results in economic advantage as workers are provided with health
insurance and pensions. The legal trust arrangement coupled with reporting
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Table 2. Multiemployer Pension Plan Coverage and Wage Rates by Selected
Industry, 1996
Multiemployer pension
participants as percent
of total DB plan
participants, 1996

Average hourly wages
for nonsupervisory and
production workers
in 2000

13
58
55
2
10
94

$9.21
na
na
17.04
19.28
17.13

97–99

17.43

92–96
73

na
16.74

Agriculture
Hunting and trapping
Fruit and nuts
Mining
Coal Mining
Construction
Electrical work, masonry,
stone, carpeting, Xooring,
concrete, rooWng, sheet
metal, plumbing, heating/
cooling, paper hanging, etc.
Highway/street, general
building contractors
Heavy construction
Manufacturing
Nondurable
Leather products/goods,
commercial/other printing
Women’s apparel
Durable
Transportation
Trucking
Water transportation
Public warehouse, terminals
Pipeline
Communication
Wholesale trade
Apparel, piece goods, notions
Meat and meat products
Alcoholic beverages
Retail trade
Drinking places
Meat and Wsh markets, clothing
Liquor, new car dealers, grocery, hobby
Finance
Service
Shoe repair and hat cleaning
General auto repair, bowling alleys
Producers, orchestras, entertainers
Nurses (RN and practical)
Laundry garment cleaning
Motion pictures
Hotels
NonproWt organizations
U.S. average

7
58
94
4
49
81
80
65
56
0.1
27
91
80
55
5
100
97
69–78
1
29
100
100
99
94
91
78
78
1
20

13.17
9.69
8.41
14.4
15.67
13.95
na
na
21.79
17.38
14.59
na
na
na
9.08
6.62
na
na
14.61
13.38
na
11.48
11.48
10.18
8.76
15.69
9.22
na
$13.24

Source: Column 1: Ratio of total participants in multiemployer DC plans to total participants in all DC plans from Form 5500 Plan data tabulated by author; industry categories
based on Form 5500 industry codes. Column 2: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000).
na = not available.
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laws makes decisions public and transparent. The equal representation
requirements help solve conXict of interest problems, because neither labor
nor management can act to beneWt their own sides alone. In particular,
trustee actions must be transparent and thus the funds must be participantfocused. As a consequence, the multiemployer fund may not forgo contributions in order to beneWt an employer or preserve an agreement. In addition
the plan governance structure ensures a participant focus by limiting means
for contributions to be altered even in the face of potential actuarial gains.
Ordinary deWnitions of prudent investment also apply; there is little difference in the asset allocations of public, private, and union funds.

Solving Collective Action Problems
Employers and workers in a multiemployer pension system pool their contributions so workers are covered by the same provisions, no matter where
the job may be, as long as the employer is participating. This will typically
be in the same industry and, often, in the same geographic region. Employers in these sectors require workers with similar skills but because of the
nature of their product demand, may not be able to hire workers on a longterm basis. In this context a collective action problem exists, such that no
single employer has the incentive to provide pensions, health care, or training if the returns on these investments cannot be returned to the sponsoring Wrm.
Multiemployer plans can be a mechanism by which Wrms and workers can
share costs, thus solving the public good problem and creating economies
of scale. Particularly when labor markets are Xuid and jobs contingent, valuable skills derived from experience may be lost in turnover. In such a case,
occupational loyalty can become increasingly important: the mobile workers obtain portable pensions and are able to save for retirement, while employers obtain skilled workers and a way to share in the cost of training.
Thus, the multiemployer plan satisWes these needs by sharing the costs and
beneWts of increased mobility.
To describe how multiemployer pensions provide security in a dynamic
market environment, it is instructive to consider the circumstances of a
group of nurses employed in New Jersey health care providers. These nurses
have sought inclusion in a multiemployer plan operated by the International Union of Operating Engineers rather than their hospital’s singleemployer plan, since hospital ownership has changed many times through
mergers and restructurings. One nurse noted that she had been covered by
six separate single-employer DB plans, but she has no idea of anticipated
beneWts from any of them. The pension plan administrator observed,
“when an industry is poorly managed and unstable the multiemployer plan
is the only option for meaningful retirement coverage” (Fanning 2001).
Here the multiemployer plan, by virtue of the diversity of its industry base
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and connection with a long-standing union, is seen as providing a more
secure pension promise than the traditional single-employer model.

Hybrid Features of Multiemployer Plans
In a multiemployer model, participating Wrms pay a speciWed contribution
into the plan according to a collective-bargaining agreement that varies
according to bargaining power. In other words contributions depend on
the company’s relative ability to pay and the union’s ability to bargain for
beneWts (Chamberlain and Kuhn 1986). Thus in the typical multiemployer
plan, the employer’s contribution is deWned but the worker’s beneWt is also
speciWed — the latter is what makes it formally a deWned beneWt pension.
In a multiemployer DB plan, an employer would account for pension
costs just as in a DC plan, with the amount not determined unilaterally
but rather by a collective bargaining agreement. What makes it a hybrid is
that beneWts are speciWed as guaranteed annuities, most often based on a
worker’s service credits, pay, and disability conditions. Consequently these
plans are hybrids between deWned contribution and deWned beneWt plans.
Most multiemployer plans have a uniform beneWt according to the area
contract. The employers in a given area tend to pay a uniform rate that
may change as a result of varying economic conditions. For example, pension contributions have responded over time to rising health insurance
premiums.
The Sheet Metal Workers’ pension plan is typical in many ways of the
multiemployer model. Here the retirement beneWt depends on a formula
that includes years of service, hours worked per year (hours over 1,400
per year are credited at lower rates), an adjustment rate determined by an
actuary, and an hourly contribution that varies by local. Since contribution
rates vary by local (as do wages), plan members with the same career proWle
but covered under different contracts will get different eventual retirement
beneWts.
The Central Pension Fund of the Operating Engineers (CPF) and the
Western Conference of Teamsters plans tie employers’ contributions directly
to actual beneWts paid. The beneWt formula is then based on a rate determined by fund trustees and the balance of a Wnal “account,” making this
approach analogous to a cash balance plan. For example, the monthly
annuity is worth 3.5 percent of a retiree’s account balance; if a member
works thirty years and has $50,000 of contributions credited from various
employers, the retirement beneWt would be $1,750 per month (in the 2001
CPF plan). Like cash balance plans, these beneWts accrue on a career basis
rather than a Wnal average pay basis, and different rates prevail in different contracts, reXecting employers’ differential abilities to pay and levels
of bargaining power. In the CPF, contribution rates vary from $0.050 to
$5.60 per hour; in the Western conference of Teamsters the range is similar,
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from $0.60 to over $6.00 per hour. The range is similar in the Sheet Metal
Worker’s plan.
While plan trustees track contribution rates for locals and determine
workers’ beneWts, multiemployer plans are not required to keep records on
what each employer pays for a given employee since this is not required by
law. In practice, trustees sometimes have difWculties ensuring that employers actually pay required contributions.

Breaks in Service
The multiemployer plan environment has been able to adapt relatively Xexibly to changes in the labor market. For example, deWned beneWt plans
typically have rules about “breaks in service” having to do with how long a
participant may be out of employment before losing the right to return to
the plan and continue accruing beneWts. In practice, multiemployer plans
have exhibited substantial Xexibility over the business cycle in terms of
service rules, subject of course to ERISA requirements. During the 1970s
recession, for instance, the Sheet Metal Workers Fund lengthened its rule
regarding how long a worker could be out of employment before credited
service was lost. This produces costs to the pension plan, of course, so other
beneWts had to be implicitly weakened in reaction. Nevertheless, this Xexibility reveals multiemployer pension fund sensitivity to industry needs and
worker concern with security.

Disability, Early Retirement, and Unretirement
Multiemployer plans tend to have generous early retirement eligibility and
disability rules, reXective of the blue-collar and low-pay nature of the jobs.
In addition, multiemployer plans tend to tailor disability and return-towork rules to the needs of the particular group and accommodate employers’ differing abilities to pay. The earliest age for collection of retiree
beneWts is 62, though employers may offer early retirement bonuses on an
ad hoc basis.
Multiemployer plans also have special early retirement provisions that
are effective responses to changes in speciWc industry employment patterns.
Recently some Taft-Hartley plans have also liberalized “suspension of beneWt” rules prohibiting retirees from returning to work in their career industry, recognizing increases in demand for experienced employees. Other
Taft-Hartley pension funds are considering plan redesigns that incorporate
deferred retirement option plans (DROPs), which is a way to facilitate
phased retirement. Under this arrangement, plans can modify their suspension of beneWt rules to suspend only a portion of the beneWt based on
hours worked. This approach provides greater Xexibility to design a program that best meets the needs of the participants.
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Another way multiemployer plans have been responsive to the economic
environment has to do with “suspension of pension” rules. This arises
because of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which requires
funds to continue paying pension beneWts if a retiree returns to work in his
same industry but is employed fewer than 40 hours a month or 480 hours in
a year. If he should work more than this, the fund can legally restrict his
pension beneWts until he leaves that employ.
In some sectors the particular threshold chosen to determine whether
the pension is suspended, 40 or 480 hours, matters a great deal. For example, in construction, employers often need workers more than 40 hours
per month but require them only a few months per year. As a result in
that industry, a 40-hour per month rule proves more restrictive than is
the 480-hour rule. In practice, since multiemployer plans are managed by
employers and unions, the rules are often varied according to labor market
conditions. For example, the Central Pension Fund of the Operating Engineers switched from the liberal to the restrictive rule in the 1970s to retard
the growth in nonunion construction (Fanning 2001). Likewise during the
1990s the severe labor shortages in most of the major crafts put pressure
on the many of the funds to switch back to the more liberal 480-hour rule
restriction. The Sheet Metal Workers fund and CPF have resisted the more
liberal rules arguing that collectively bargained pensions might subsidize
nonunion employers and erode pension contributions, if “return to work
rules” are too permissive. On the other hand, many unions have hailed the
congressional rule change lifting the earnings test for older workers under
social security. Indeed, the Western Conference of Teamsters plan restricts
employment eligibility only for members under the age of 65. After age 65,
pensions are no longer suspended for delayed retirement (Saunders 2001).
Of course the strict suspension beneWt rules can hurt union employment.
There are no union employers for which the older individual can work,
particularly if labor markets are tight. In such cases, it is likely that the suspension of beneWt rules would be liberalized so that pensioners can work
without losing beneWts. Further having retired union members working for
a nonunion employer can improve the chances of successfully organizing.
In some cases having a union employee working for a large nonunion company offers “salts” in places the union is seeking to organize.

Reciprocity
Most multiemployer plans in the United States developed reciprocity agreements with each other in the 1970s and 1980s. Reciprocity agreements are
arrangements between local unions with different plans permitting continued beneWts coverage when each others’ members work across jurisdictions. While reciprocity methods vary, the result is that workers continue to
be covered when they move between member employers.
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Economies of Scale
The average collectively bargained multiemployer plan is larger than the
average single-employer plan, enabling this multiemployer format to take
advantage of scale economies. Twenty percent of single-employer deWned
beneWt participants are in plans with more than 50,000 participants, while
the fraction is 42 percent among multiemployer participants (USDOL
2000). Scale economies are conWrmed by many researchers, who Wnd that
larger pension plans are less expensive to administer than small plans. For
example Hustead (1996) found that small funds (with 15 participants or
fewer) spent about 58 percent of normal cost on administrative expenses,
while large plans (with 10,000+ participants) spent about 2.5 percent of
normal cost. Of course these costs vary with participant mix, since service
levels differ depending on the fraction of actives versus retirees (Mitchell
and Andrews 1981; Ghilarducci and Terry 1999). On the other hand, multiemployer plans are often regional and the fact that they are sometimes
small explains why they were formed in the Wrst place.

Cross Subsidies
All deWned beneWt plans entail cross-subsidies across members. The clearest one involves transfers between retirees who die earlier than their life expectancy versus those who live longer than their life expectancy. In addition
there have been periodic discussions about other types of cross-subsidies in
the multiemployer context, such as between large and small employers, or
wealthier and less well-off union locals. One case highlighting this issue
occurred when the United Parcel Service proposed in 1997 that its employees leave the Teamsters multiemployer pension plan and instead have their
own single-employer plan. The employer argued that it was subsidizing
smaller employers in that multiemployer framework, a point that the union
partially conceded by recognizing that UPS membership helped achieve
scale economies. On the other hand, the union contended that without
an actuarial study, it was impossible to know whether the resulting singleemployer plan would provide beneWts that were as least as good, for less
money. In addition, the UPS workers would lose their trustee representatives
in a single-employer plan, which they believed would affect the chances of
their receiving ad hoc COLA increases in their pension beneWts, and portability rights to other participating employers would also be lost.
In another context, some members of the Central Pension Fund (CPF) of
the Operating Engineers have experienced higher levels of contributions
and growth than others, leading to some concern that they are “carrying”
the poorer and shrinking locals. In this case too, some eighty actuarial
studies would have to be conducted to determine whether each local’s past
and projected experience would yield better beneWts than under the CPF.
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Thus far no study has been conducted of the cross-subsidies and how they
would be unwound if the parent plan were to be broken up.
In the Episcopal Church, there is an explicit policy of redistribution
between higher- and lower-paid clergy. This is evident in the pension formula, where the basic beneWt consists of a higher percentage (1.75 percent)
of the average of the highest seven years for the Wrst $10,000 of salary,
but 1.5 percent for pay beyond that. The beneWt is not indexed to inXation
formally, but the Episcopal fund has provided an ad hoc cost of living
adjustment since 1980 by issuing a “13th check” that is based on years of
service. Within every level of service, the 13th check is the same, however
(e.g., a minister with a $7,000 beneWt will get the same amount as one with
a $30,000 beneWt; Blanchard 2001).

Inflation Protection
The inXation protection provided by multiemployer pension plans is worth
highlighting since it contrasts with corporate plan behavior. As mentioned
above, there is no mechanism to stop contributions to the pension trust
once these are set by a collective bargaining agreement. As a result, multiemployer trustees can and often do raise retiree beneWts to compensate
for inXation losses. These inXation payments can be made via the “13th
check” discussed above, or an ad hoc basis by issuing beneWt increases that
depend on the retiree’s years of credited service and age.

Joint Governance and Trust Fund Structure
The multiemployer governance structure can permit the sharing of investment gains between workers and employers. In practice, multiemployer DB
plans have passed on more pension fund investment gains to participants
than have single employers. Thus between 1984 and 1996, single-employer
DB plan contributions per participant fell 29 percent, while multiemployer
plan contributions fell by 37 percent. Despite this, beneWts in multiemployer plans grew 26 percent versus only 6 percent in corporate DB plans.
During the same period, multiemployer DC plan contributions rose 8 percent, while (contrary to popular belief ) corporate employers cut back on
DC contributions by 20 percent; see Table 3.
There are also differences in behavior when a pension plan is overfunded. If robust investment earnings cause the pension fund assets to
surpass 150 percent of liabilities, this eliminates tax deductibility of further
contributions. In such a case, contributions must be cut, or beneWts can
be boosted. In practice, multiemployer plans tend to increase beneWts or
slow down employer contribution increases in the next round of collective
bargaining. By contrast, corporate employers tend mainly to cut back on
contributions. As a result, jointly trusteed plans pass on pension funds gains
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Table 3. Pension Generosity, Employer Contributions, and Worker Contributions
to Pension Plans by Sponsor Type, selected years 1984–96 (2000 dollars,
data weighted by share of active participants in group)
Top 1000 corporate
pension plans
(by asset size)
DeWned beneWt plans
Total employer
contributions per
total participants*
Average generosity**
(normal cost/
active participant)

Real change
(1984–1996)

1984

1996

−0.29

$3,379

$2,394

0.06

2,224

2,356

−0.20

2,924

2,327

0.51

1,907

2,879

−0.37

3,104

1,962

0.26

1,399

1,763

0.08

2,679

2,901

5.633

3.3

189

DeWned contribution plans
Total employer
contributions per
total participant
Worker contributions
per active participant***
Top 100 Multiemployer
Pension Plans
(by asset size)
DeWned beneWt plans
Total employer
contributions per
total participant
Average generosity
(normal cost/
active participant)
DeWned contribution plans
Total employer
contributions per
total participant
Worker contributions
per active participant

Source: Author’s tabulations, Form 5500 data. Obvious outliers were omitted when employer
contributions per participant exceeded $20,000 and when total participants, generosity, and
worker contributions were negative.
Notes:
*
Employer contributions are measured as the sum of Form 5500 item 32a(1a) and item
32a(2). Total participants include total active participants (item 7a(4)) and total retirees
(item 7b).
** Normal cost is deWned as item 9b in Form 5500 Schedule B Wlings.
***
Worker contribution is deWned as item 32a(1b) in Form 5500 Wlings.
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to participants while single employers tend to pass these gains to shareholders and owners. These differences between corporate and multiemployer plan trends are due to differences in contribution structure, the fact
that multiemployer plans have a more transparent pension decision-making
structure, and the fact that multiemployer trustees tend to be held more
accountable by plan participants. As a result, the two plan structures appear
to behave differently in the face of similar economic shocks.

Challenges to the Employer-Based Benefit Paradigm
and Implications for Multiemployer Plans
As noted above, pension coverage in the United States remains voluntary,
and has leveled off at around 50 percent of the workforce. The fact that
coverage has not risen despite a booming economy and labor shortages in
some sectors has suggested to some that the employer-based pension system
may have become too inXexible to accommodate the new workplace realities. Further evidence of the changed beneWt paradigm can be seen in the
pension arena where worker participation in DC plans has risen dramatically and fallen in DB plans (Mitchell and Schieber 1998; Turner 1993;
Turner and Watanabe 1995). The shift toward DC plans and the popularity
of 401(k)s also represents a move away from group-based solutions to
insurance to individual-oriented solutions. This is reXected in the fact that
the overall fraction of pay going to beneWts has declined over time: the
share of total compensation going to beneWts survey declined from 42 percent to 37 percent between 1989 and 1999 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce
1999). Conversely, cash compensation dominates in casual, short-term, spot
labor markets, and this beneWt decline is not merely an artifact of the fastest
growing industries and occupations. At the same time, the business community has been rethinking its role and its social obligation in sponsoring
employee beneWts.

Explanations for Shifts in the Benefits Paradigm
Various explanations have been offered for these changes in the U.S. beneWts environment. Some argue that the “social contract” is being realigned
between workers and employers, while other commentators argue that the
traditional social contract has collapsed (Osterman 1999). It may be that
increased worker mobility is driving the trend to DC plans, because pensions now need to be delinked from a single employer. Some weaknesses of
the DB system may also have eroded worker conWdence that employers are
committed to pensions, including the lack of regular cost-of-living increases
and the evidence that employers have taken contribution holidays in the
last decade. Of course, the 1990s bull market may have led some to discount
the investment risk inherent in DC plans. In general, these explanations
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point to workers as agents of change. That is, the “individual responsibility”
framework is the logical result of more independent “new-economy” workers rejecting traditional beneWts like health insurance and pensions and
paternalistic social contracts.
Another explanation for the rise of the individual responsibility model is
that worker bargaining power has fallen over time. Employer norms, needs,
and increased market power relative to workers has diminished employer
willingness to sponsor work-based insurance programs. To illustrate this
point, when workers express their choices via unions and collective bargaining, they favor beneWts and have over 30 percent more compensation
in employee beneWts.3 Additionally, they select DB plans with supplemental
DC programs.
Some policymakers contend that it would be useful to encourage the
move to separate employee beneWts from the employment relationship.
Examples of this approach in the private sector include proposed legislation for personal tax credits for individual employee beneWts, the growth
of medical savings accounts, and E-commerce individual health plans. Also
private sector trends toward individual responsibility have been manifested
in the outright elimination of DB pensions and retiree health coverage.The
largest private sector employer, Wal-Mart, with over 850,000 employees, provides health insurance to less than 40 percent of its workforce, and instead
the company sponsors individual account savings plans dominated by investments in its own corporate stock. In the public sector this trend is also seen,
with DC pensions being adopted in Florida and Michigan.
On the other hand, there is evidence contradicting the view that beneWt
trends result from employee pressure to adopt the individual responsibility
model. Labor economists tentatively agree that job instability is increasing,4
which could mean either that workers are voluntarily leaving their jobs after
shorter periods of employment, or that Wrms are offering low-commitment
relationships. The jobs where instability has increased are particularly those
for whom pension accruals might be thought to be the most crucial: for
men age 45–54 and 55–64, and particularly for African-American men.
Workers with more than nine years of service are those on the brink of
vesting, but this group is experiencing the largest declines in job stability.
Women and workers with less than two years of service have been least
affected. Occupational data show managerial and clerical job security falling signiWcantly but less than for service and blue-collar workers (Neumark
2000). In sum, the increase in cash-intensive pay and job instability suggests
that employer commitment to workers over the long term is waning.
While the future cannot be predicted, it may be that the individual
responsibility model of employee beneWts will be short-lived. This is because
the unprecedented economic growth and booming stock market of the
last two decades provided a best-case incubator for the rapid expansion
and acceptance of individual-account DC pensions. These trends were also
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facilitated by substantial market deregulation and declining rates of unionization in the labor force. If the economy is to sustain a prolonged stock
market downturn or a severe recession, this will test worker tolerance for
risk that individual account pension plans have shifted to employees.

Advantages to Participants
Several important risks must be managed in a work-based pension scheme:
employment, investment and default, consumer, longevity, inXation, and
heuristic risks. Multiemployer plans’ contribution and governance structure and transparency of Wduciary decisions work to workers’ and retirees’
advantage by maximizing pension income and minimizing many of these
risks.
Employment risk is important for those covered by corporate DB plans
because the beneWt accrual pattern is backloaded, and beneWts are worth
less if the worker leaves the Wrm before accumulating meaningful credits
or account balances. While 401(k) and other DC plans minimize this risk,
retirement balances may be eroded if people cash out their lump sums
when changing jobs. Multiemployer plans, on the other hand, mitigate this
employment risk as long as the worker remains covered by contributing
employers.
Investment and default risks are protected against in all U.S. DB plans
since the retirement beneWt is guaranteed by the fund, and backstopped by
the Pension BeneWt Guaranty Corporation in the event of asset insufWciency.
Consumer risk refers to participants’ exposure to excessive administrative
expenses that retail savers might otherwise face. DB plans and professionally administered DC plans can minimize such consumer risk in contrast
to self-directed individual plans, via economies of scale and professional
monitoring.
Longevity risk concerns the risk that retirees outlive their accounts. DB
plans generally pay life beneWts, protecting against this concern, whereas
DC plans are far less likely to provide annuity payouts. In this sense DB
plans offer a risk pool better protecting plan participants.
InXation risk has to do with the fact that over a long retirement period,
beneWts Wxed in nominal terms will suffer eroding purchasing power. It
appears that, in practice, multiemployer plans do a far better job than do
corporate DB plans in protecting against this risk.
Heuristic risk is another concern in pension plan design. This arises,
for instance, due to bias toward saliency, loss aversion, undue optimism,
and other factors under current investigation in the behavioral Wnance literature. It is been suggested that participants in self-directed pension plans,
particularly 401(k)s, may see depressed investment returns because they
tend to make wrong choices, trade and borrow too much, engage in market
timing, and experience high costs of trading (Bureau of National Affairs
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2001). Evidently the DB model is superior on this count inasmuch as participants do not make individual investment decisions about their pension
assets.
In sum, under DB plans workers are protected from some of the risks
they bear in DC plans, and multiemployer DB plans can play a role mitigating all of these.

Advantages to Employers
Some employers, particularly smaller ones, can Wnd substantial advantages
to joining a multiemployer plan. This is because the multiemployer structure allows them to provide pensions to themselves, ofWce staff, and their
workers efWciently, and help solve labor supply problems.
One way in which pensions are beneWcial to employers is that having
a pension plan tends to cut down on worker mobility. As a consequence,
employers can invest in employee training in the expectation that these
workers will be there in years to come. Such “win-win” trades help make the
economy more productive (Ghilarducci and Reich 2001).
Another way multiemployer plans help employers manage the supply
of labor is through reciprocity. This means that skilled workers from one
geographic region can work in another geographic region without losing
beneWt coverage. This has proven useful in industries experiencing substantial volatility such as in construction. For instance, the University of
Notre Dame is adding an extension to its football Weld, something the university does only once or twice a century. As a result, the handful of bricklayers and masonry workers in South Bend cannot meet the demand and
workers had to be imported from other regions. During this time, work in
South Bend still counts toward service credit in their home pension plan.
Such pension reciprocity in regional multiemployer plans keeps employers
and workers from overspending on training, and helps protect workers
from Xuctuations in earnings.

Pensions and the Income of the Elderly
Concern over the well-being of the elderly also motivates concern over the
lack of growth in employment-based pension coverage. Pensions today represent two-Wfths of retirement wealth for the average American household
on the verge of retirement (Moore and Mitchell 2000). Sltottje, Woodbury,
and Anderson (2000) show that only Social Security and the ownership of
primary residence does more to counteract the unequalizing effects of business assets and stocks and bonds on income and wealth inequality among
elderly Americans. Employment-based pension income is less equally distributed than total retiree income, an unsurprising Wnding since those in
higher tax brackets have more incentive to shelter pay in pension plans.
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The Future of Multiemployer Plans
Because growth in U.S. pension coverage has apparently stalled, several
groups have called for a new institutional framework that can serve to increase coverage among the noninsured. As ERISA attorney Michael Gordon
has noted, this requires devoting attention to “the twin areas” of small business and the nontraditional workforce (Gordon 2000). He notes that in
single-employer plans, beneWt provision is often motivated by corporate tax
breaks for pension contributions. By contrast, high turnover rates among
small businesses render such incentives rather valueless. Instead, Gordon
posits that the multiemployer model could be extended by offering tax
incentives to workers and small employers for participation in a new form
of statutorily approved multiemployer plan. Gordon claims that some representatives of collectively bargained multiemployer plans would welcome
employers not in a collectively bargained agreement. This would permit
employees to have complete portability between member employers, akin to
the voluntary plans in Europe.
One disadvantage to pooling is that Wrms have to overcome competing
with one another in order to coordinate the establishment of plans. Unfortunately these barriers are so high that most multiemployer plans are coordinated by a union or are in a nonproWt setting. The exceptions are public
sector multiemployer plans where governing bodies initiate the coordination. Another disadvantage, related to the Wrst, is that the arrangements are
voluntary. When one Wrm views its liability as much less than average they
will have incentive to leave. (The adverse selection problem is one reason
that Social Security, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and
the like have been structured as mandatory programs.)
From one perspective it would seem that individual-oriented plans would
be chief competitors and substitutes for multiemployer plans. After all,
single-employer pensions cover the worker population relevant to a given
Wrm. But perceived barriers to expansion of group-based multiemployer
pensions may be turned around to help create them. The popularity of
401(k) and 403(b)s stress their portability advantages, while stock market
volatility highlights their disadvantages. Multiemployer hybrids, with portability and deWned beneWt features, may look better in contrast.
Moreover, much of the focus on these plans is mainly because of the technologies that can make them more visible. Because of this narrow focus,
workers have a difWcult time seeing how their 401(k) plan Wts in with their
entire package of employer beneWts. It is possible that instead of being a barrier to the creation and maintenance of multiemployer plans, multiemployer
plan sponsors can facilitate employee education and provision of a range of
beneWts. There are at least eleven different types of multiemployer plans including pensions. Employers would gain from using the technology to help
workers recognize and appreciate all the noncash compensation provided.
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Perhaps the technology allowing individuals and employers to Wnd medical plans on the Internet do what group-based employer plans did, which
is to get economies of scales. Perhaps the technology allows individual
arrangements to be cheaper than employer-coordinated plans. The fundamental impetus for employers to combine and provide pensions is not
economies of scale but to restrain competition and the “race to the bottom.”
The most proWtable short-term strategy is to provide no beneWts at all and
get market share with low prices. But employers from the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution knew competition through cost cutting was cannibalism. Taking wages and service and skill-related compensation out of
competition, the industry can invest in more capital and training.
Multiemployer plans may become a key labor-organizing tool in the Silicon Valley. Amy Dean, president of the South Bay Central Labor Council,
AFL-CIO, promotes multiemployer plans because of the chronic lack of
coverage by small employers. “There is potential for taking advantage of
economies of scale in administrative costs by pooling small employers in the
same industry together thereby increasing the portability of pensions”
(Brenner et al. 1999: 67). The union-based organization, Working Partnerships, USA envisions employer-training networks to be connected to the
health and pension consortiums.

Conclusion
In our view, the increasing prevalence of cash compensation and the
decline of employee beneWts as a fraction of payroll are attributable to a
sea change in the nature of the employer-employee relationship in the U.S.
labor market. In contrast to years gone by, a lifelong mutual commitment
between Wrms and workers is no longer the norm. The multiemployer
beneWt framework, in our view, offers an important exception to this trend.
Although multiemployer plans in both the private and public sectors
cover very different types of workers, from janitors to university presidents,
they are similar in that they solve three key problems. First, but perhaps
least important, multiemployer plans can take advantage of savings on large
group annuities and professional management fees. Second, multiemployer
plans recognize the skill management and insurance needs of a heterogeneous workplace, where patterns differ by unique industry/occupation.
Third, multiemployer plans can help solve the collective action problem:
that is, no one employer may have an incentive to provide beneWts or training without its competitors doing so, so joint action can be efWcient for all.
The continuing importance of negotiated multiemployer plans attests to
how a central agent, such as a union, can offer a key beneWt function in
the service of employees and also of assistance to employers. Compared to
the one-size-Wts-all structure of Social Security, multiemployer plans can
adapt to the idiosyncrasies of particular industries and occupations. In this
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sense, delinking pensions from the single employer via multiemployer plans
may hold out hope to resolving portability and income security problems.
Multiemployer plans may also serve as a model for expanding social insurance across employers. These plans do what human resource experts and
industrial innovation experts say must be done: the plans can lower the
cost of training by reducing the chance of workers leaving the industry or
occupation.
Notes
1. In the 1930s and 1940s the UMWA covered a majority (80 percent) of mineworkers. The union was so wealthy that it helped organize emerging unions in the
Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) which covered workers in the rubber,
steel, and auto industries. In the mid 1940s, the UMWA directed its bargaining
power toward pensions.
2. The Episcopal Church plan idea came from a patron who noticed “that pastors
and priests were working way past their age of effectiveness and they wanted to help
people retire at a reasonable age. The age was set at 68.” Human resource management needs therefore shaped the development of this clergy plan.
3. The difference in beneWts is substantial if one compares them across union and
nonunion sectors. For example union workers had 37 percent of compensation
devoted to beneWts versus 29 percent for nonunion manufacturing employees in
1999. This gap persists in non-manufacturing where beneWts make up 33 percent of
union workers’ compensation and 25 percent of workers’ remuneration (USBLS
1999). The positive union effect on beneWts may result from the workings of group
processes enabling workers to overcome myopia and overoptimism regarding risks
due to poor health, disability, and retirement. Economies of scale may also explain
the relative growth in beneWts in multiemployer settings. In addition, unions provide job protection and “voice,” helping form training and deferred compensation
agreements.
4. Job tenure among men has fallen over time in the U.S. For example, average
seniority on the job for men age 45–54 fell from almost 13 years to over 9 years.
Among men age 55–64, average seniority was over 15 years in 1983, but had
dropped to 11 by 1998. Among women, by contrast, tenure has increased by 5 percent over this same period, with the largest increases seen among older women
workers (USBLS 1998).
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